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How the Federal Reserve aided the Peoples Bank of
China in addressing its 2015 Stock Market Crash
|By Alec Buchholtz
On March 21, 2016, Reuters published an article entitled – Exclusive: China central bank to
Fed: A little help, please? – regarding an email exchange between Mr. Xiangyan Song, Chief
Representative for the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) Americas Office in New York and Mr.
Steven Kamin, Director of the Division of International Finance at the Federal Reserve Board
that occurred in July 2015. Mr. Song and the PBOC sought advice from the Federal Reserve
on how to respond to turmoil in the PBOC stock market that the central bank had been
grappling with for over a month, “asking it to share its playbook for dealing with Wall Street’s
‘Black Monday’ crash of 1987” and to “[i]nform us ASAP about the major measures you took
at that time…” (Reuters 2016, PBOC-Federal Reserve Emails).
According to the article, on July 27, 2015, China’s stock market experienced successive days
of market turbulence and was down 8.5% at close of business. (Reuters 2016)(See also Dun
and Bradstreet 2015). Mr. Song reached out to the Mr. Kamin via email seeking advice on the
specific measures that the Federal Reserve had taken in response to similar market
conditions that had occurred in the United States in 1987. On October 19, 1987, which would
come to be known as “Black Monday,” the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped 22.6 %.
(Bernhardt and Eckblad 2013).
Mr. Kamin responded to the request by providing a 259-word summary of the Federal
Reserve’s actions in October 1987, attaching seven publicly available files related to those
actions. Each document was accompanied by a short annotation as shown below:
1. “Greenspan Statement to Congress 1988 – Discussion of Federal Reserve actions
2. FOMC conference call on Oct 20 1987 – discussion of market developments
3. Brief history of 1987 stock market crash – Federal Reserve working paper on events
surrounding the crash, and the response of the Federal Reserve
4. Greenbook for FOMC October 28 1987 – See discussion of financial developments
starting on page 38 of the pdf.
5. Bluebook for FOMC October 30 1987 – See “Recent Developments” discussion
starting in page 1
6. FOMC meeting minutes Nov 3 1987 – See discussion on page -10- on why the Federal
Reserve used repos to inject liquidity instead of conducting outright purchases of Tbills.
7. FOMC record of policy actions Nov 3 1987 – See discussion starting on page -5- of
Federal Reserve policy actions.” (PBOC-Federal Reserve Emails).
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The email summary provided by Mr. Kamin highlighted a few key responses to the U.S.
market turbulence in mid-October 1987. First, the Federal Reserve issued several
statements “pledging to provide ample liquidity” and “recognizing that the conduct of open
market operations…required special flexibility.” (PBOC-Federal Reserve Emails). One way
this was conducted was by injecting cash into the U.S. banking system via repurchase
agreements. Second, it expanded the range of collateral open to primary dealers, which
suspended the “size limits imposed on loans of securities…and the requirement that such
loans not be related to short sales.” (Ibid.) Lastly, the Federal Reserve increased supervision
services over “primary government securities dealers and interdealer government securities
brokers” by placing more Federal Reserve employees on location at those dealers. (Ibid.)
Following the exchange, the PBOC increased its use of repurchase agreements throughout
the summer of 2015, similar to how the Federal Reserve had in 1987. (Ibid.) According to
the Reuters article, the PBOC’s central bank does not have as much autonomy as the Federal
Reserve does to conduct monetary policy and largely implements policies decided by
political leaders. By contrast, the Federal is a body independent from the U.S. legislative and
executive branches. (Ibid.) However, addressing the actions taken that summer, Chinese
Premier Li Keqiang believed that the PBOC “did not respond sufficiently but China had
fended off systemic risks,” having devalued the currency and insuring that financial
institutions had access to market operations for short-term liquidity. (Ibid.)
The YPFS’s New Bagehot Project seeks to make sharing of information and best practices
between central bankers and other policymakers much easier. When it is fully developed,
policymakers will be able to access the online platform 24 hours and search out similar
“playbook” information as well as the actual implementation documents.
The emails described in the Reuters article were acquired pursuant to a Freedom of Information
Act request submitted by the article’s author, Jason Lange, an economic correspondent for
Reuters. We are grateful to Mr. Lange for providing copies of these to the Yale Program on
Financial Stability. The emails and cited documents are available by clicking on the above links
or by searching the YPFS Resource Library.
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